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ESTABLISHING A POSITIVE RIGHT TO MIGRATE AS A
SOLUTION TO FOOD SCARCITY
ABSTRACT
Using the lenses of refugee and human rights law, this Comment examines
whether food scarcity creates a positive right to migrate, and if so, what its
relationship is with states’ “largely unfettered domain of territorial
sovereignty.” If there is a right to life under human rights law, then access to
food is a corollary right of equal value and any hindrance to food access is a
violation of that right, regardless of whether the cause is political, civil,
economic, or social. Case studies from Paraguay and Somalia illustrate how
neither current refugee law nor a traditional conception of human rights
remedies the situation for populations migrating due to food scarcity. Instead,
this Comment proposes that where an individual’s or a group’s rights are
being violated due to food scarcity, and where the food scarcity cannot be
readily remedied in situ, then that person or group has the right to migrate
internationally in order to become food secure. However, the utility of casting
a positive right to migrate in the human rights mold depends on a shift to a
people-centric human rights approach that transcends national borders and
runs counter to the Westphalian system of state sovereignty.
INTRODUCTION
Between 2011 and 2013, a total of 842 million people in developing
regions suffered from chronic hunger.1 In 16 countries, the Food and
Agriculture Organization found that food security had either not progressed at
all or had deteriorated since 1990.2 International conventions such as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) establish that everyone has
a right to life and is entitled to a standard of living that provides for adequate
1 See FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, HUNGER MAP 2013,
[hereinafter HUNGER MAP] available at http://www.fao.org/hunger/en/. Chronic hunger, also referred to as
“undernourishment,” is defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations as “a state,
lasting for at least one year, of inability to acquire enough food, defined as a level of food intake insufficient to
meet dietary energy requirements.” FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
HUNGER PORTAL, http://www.fao.org/hunger/en/.
2 HUNGER MAP, supra note 1.
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health and wellbeing, including the right to food.3 Access to food is a corollary
right of equal value to the right to life, and any hindrance to food access is a
violation of that right, regardless of whether the cause is political, civil,
economic, or social.4 In addition, the UDHR, as well as other human rights
conventions like the Convention on Migrant Workers, establishes that
everyone is entitled to freedom of movement within one’s own country and
freedom to leave any country.5 The question then arises, what happens when
these rights are in tension with fundamental principles of state sovereignty? If
one cannot achieve an “adequate standard of living,” does one have the right to
seek out that standard of living elsewhere, even if it is outside of one’s country
of origin? Freedom to move within one’s country, or freedom to leave any
foreign country, is not the same as a positive right6 to international migration.
Using the lenses of refugee and human rights law, this Comment examines
whether food scarcity creates a positive right to migrate, and if so, what its
relationship is with states’ “largely unfettered domain of territorial
sovereignty.”7 Arguably, closed borders for communities facing food scarcity
can cause human rights violations by the migrants’ home state. In the absence
of available local remedies, closed borders may prevent the vulnerable
population from achieving the most basic minimum living standards
recognized under customary international law8 and guaranteed by binding
human rights conventions.9 Conversely, migration without legal recognition or
international protection leaves the vulnerable population susceptible to return
to their country of origin and to the same violations that prompted migration in

3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) art. 25
(Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
4 Ajamu Baraka, “People-Centered” Human Rights as a Framework for Social Transformation, A
VOICE FROM THE MARGINS (Dec. 10, 2013), www.ajamubaraka.com/the-human-rights-project-determined-bythe-needs-of-the-powerful/.
5 UDHR, supra note 3, art. 13; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/158, art. 8 (Dec. 18, 1990)
[hereinafter Migrant Workers Convention].
6 A positive right is “[a] right entitling a person to have another do some act for the benefit of the person
entitled.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). In other words, a positive right is ‘the freedom to do,’ as
opposed to a negative right, which is ‘the freedom from.’ Id.
7
Linda S. Bosniak, State Sovereignty, Human Right, and the New UN Migrant Workers Convention, in
WIDESPREAD MIGRATION: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 86 AM. SOC’Y. INT’L L.
PROC. 623, 634 (1992).
8 See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 3, art. 25.
9 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 Dec. 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter ICESCR]; see infra Part I.B.
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the first place.10 Currently, the right to migrate is granted in response to severe
human rights violations in the form of refugee law.11 Refugees, however, are a
narrowly defined category.12 Additionally, there are persuasive arguments
regarding the right to not be displaced and a new and growing body of legal
and political thought on environmental refugees.13
While refugee law addresses sudden, violent, or extreme deprivations, it
does little to account for slow degradation of the environment or social,
political, or economic changes that drive subsistence farmers from their lands
and lead to international migrations. For example, in Paraguay, small family
farms have slowly been taken over by large mono-crop operations run by
transnational corporations.14 The result has been a loss of land for small
farmers and an inability to produce enough subsistence crops or to compete in
the marketplace, first leading to migration to internal cities and then to
migration to international destinations like Buenos Aires.15 In contrast to the
slow push in Paraguay, Somalis faced regional drought and famine in 2011.16
As a result, more than 100,000 Somalis fled to Ethiopia and Kenya in a single
year.17 Neither the Paraguayan nor the Somali migrants qualified as refugees
under international law.18

10

See infra Part I.A. Migrants without legal recognition or refugee status are not subject to the principles
of non-refoulment. See INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW: GLOSSARY ON
MIGRATION, 44–45 (2004).
11 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter
Refugee Convention].
12 A refugee is an individual who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.
Id.
13 See Maria Stavropoulou, The Right Not to Be Displaced, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 689 (1994).
14 INT’L ORG. MIGRATION, PERFIL MIGRATORIO DE PARAGUAY [PARAGUAY MIGRATION PROFILE] 5
(Hugo Addone ed., 2011). [hereinafter PARAGUAY MIGRATION PROFILE].
15 Id. at 19, 35.
16 IOM Appeals for US$ 26 Million to Assist Victims of Famine and Drought in the Horn of Africa, INT’L
ORG. MIGRATION (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/news-and-views/press-briefingnotes/pbn-2011/pbn-listing/iom-appeals-for-us-26-million-to-assist.html [hereinafter I.O.M. Appeals for US$
26 Million].
17 INT’L ORG. MIGRATION, Migration Mapping Service between Somalia and Dadaab in Kenya
Highlights Need for Better Protection of Drought and Famine Victims (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.iom.int/
cms/en/sites/iom/home/news-and-views/press-briefing-notes/pbn-2011/pbn-listing/migration-mapping-servicebetween-somali.html.
18 See infra Part II.
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This Comment argues that neither current refugee law nor a traditional
conception of human rights remedies the situation for populations migrating
due to food scarcity.19 Instead, it proposes that where an individual’s rights or a
group’s rights are being violated due to food scarcity, and where the food
scarcity cannot be readily remedied in situ,20 then that individual or group has
the right to migrate internationally in order to become food secure.
Establishing a positive right to migrate in the face of food scarcity may solve
the problem, but it also runs the risk of leading the international community to
declare victory without substantive action or security for migrants fleeing food
scarcity (“food migrants”). The utility of casting a positive right to migrate in
the human rights mold depends on a shift to a people-centric—as opposed to a
state-centric—approach. This is because the current human rights framework is
ill-equipped to handle solutions that transcend national borders and run counter
to the Westphalian system of state sovereignty and nonintervention.21 Further,
a people-centric approach to human rights would accept non-state actors and
regional actors, such as individuals, community groups, religious organizations
and non-governmental organizations, as bound entities within the human rights
framework and empower those entities to protect and facilitate freedom of
movement for food migrants.22
Part I discusses the current state of refugee law and human rights law as the
lens through which to assess the plight of food migrants. Part II examines the
Paraguayan migration to Argentina and the Somali migration to Kenya
following the 2011 famine. Both case studies are used to delineate the

19

See ingra Part III.
In situ refers to actions or remedies available at the location where the food scarcity or infraction
occurs. Determining when in situ remedies are not available is a fact specific inquiry, critical to determining
which food shortages give rise to the right to migrate. See, e.g., infra Part II.
21 Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards A People-Centered
Transnational Legal Order?, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (1994). The Peace of Westphalia in 1648
ended both the Eighty Years’ War and Thirty Years’ War and established the concept of Westphalian
Sovereignty: that nation-states have complete sovereignty over their territory with no role for outside actors to
influence domestic affairs. Peace of Westphalia, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/topic/641170/Peace-of-Westphalia (last visited Jan. 22, 2014).
22 Within the current human rights framework—where rights, like political power, is treated as zerosum—a positive right to migrate due to food scarcity could create a conflict of rights between the rights of the
migrants and the rights of the already-present, domestic population. A full analysis of this conflict of rights is
beyond the scope of this Comment. However, holding all human rights as equal would naturally limit the
rights of the migrants at the point in which their migration infringes upon the rights of the local population.
Additionally, a people-centric approach to human rights eliminates the top-down nature of human rights and
may limit or completely remove the zero-sum conflict. See infra Part I.C.
20
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existence and limits of the right to migrate. Part III synthesizes the law and the
case studies, and concludes that neither refugee nor human rights law, as they
currently stand, provide protection for food migrants. However, establishing a
positive right to migrate for communities facing food scarcity, in conjunction
with a reconceptualization of the human rights framework, provides a remedy.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW, MIGRATION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Many bodies of law relate to and govern international migration, including
domestic law,23 conventions on refugees,24 conventions on labor and migrant
workers,25 regional conventions,26 and human rights conventions.27 In order to
evaluate the feasibility and implications of a positive right to migrate due to
food scarcity, one must have a general understanding of the international
conventions governing the principles of migration. Casting a positive right to
migrate as a remedy to food scarcity raises the question: what type of right?
Though many nations have domestic Bills of Rights,28 these only provide
rights to citizens and legal residents of that state, and since the problem at hand
is of a global nature, an international solution is needed. Both refugee law and
human rights law provide potential international frameworks for a positive
right to migrate. Refugee law governs the international migration of specific
vulnerable populations.29 Human rights law guarantees a particular relationship
between the state and all people within its jurisdiction—a relationship that is
violated if the people face malnutrition.30
Part I explores the legal frameworks currently in existence, under which a
positive right to migrate may be evaluated. First, Part I.A. lays the
groundwork, discussing international conventions that establish a limited right
to freedom of movement. Part I.B. discusses refugee law and efforts to expand
the definition of refugees founded in the “right to not be displaced” and the
concept of “environmental refugees.” Part I.C. addresses key internal conflicts
23

See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101.
See, e.g., Refugee Convention, supra note 11.
25 See, e.g,, Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 5.
26 See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights, 22 Nov. 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S 123 (1979)
[hereinafter ACHR].
27 See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 3.
28 See, e.g., art. 18 CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.).
29 See, e.g., Refugee Convention, supra note 12.
30 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 4, 11, 16 Dec. 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
24
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of human rights law, as well as arguments that reconceiving the human rights
discourse remedies those conflicts.
A. International Law and Migration
Numerous international conventions, both regional and global, contemplate
a fluid global population. Indeed, freedom of movement is firmly established
by international law and norms.31 For example, in the UDHR, the United
Nations affirmed “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each State.”32 The UDHR further provides:
“[e]veryone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return
to his country” but it does not provide a right to move into any other country.33
The elevation of a limited freedom of movement to a human right has been
affirmed in numerous other international conventions.34 Twenty-eight years
after the General Assembly adopted the UDHR, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) reaffirmed the freedom of movement,
stating: “everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that
territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his
residence.”35
Unlike the UDHR, the ICCPR is an international treaty that is binding on
those countries that ratify it, but its guarantee of freedom of movement is
restricted only to those individuals lawfully present in the country.36 Further,
the extent to which the freedom of movement is binding international law or
that international actors obey the mandates, is debatable. For example, the
United States never ratified the regional human rights convention for the
Americas but did ratify the ICCPR over twenty years after it was adopted by
the United Nations.37 The U.S. is among many countries where treaties are not
self-executing.38 That is, a presidential signature on a treaty does not create a
legally binding obligation unless the Senate ratifies the treaty.39 In the case of
31

UDHR, supra note 3, art. 13.
Id.
33 Id.
34 See, e.g., ICCPR supra note 30, art. 12.
35
Id.
36 Id.
37 Jimmy Carter, U.S. Finally Ratifies Human Rights Convention, THE CARTER CENTER (June 29, 1992),
http://www.cartercenter.org/news/documents/doc1369.html.
38 Id.
39 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
32
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the ICCPR, as with many human rights treaties, the Senate ratified with
numerous reservation, abrogating the bulk of the treaty obligations.40
Regional conventions have also explicitly promoted the freedom of
movement. Under the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), article
22, titled “Freedom of Movement and Residence,” provides for freedom of
movement as well as the ability to seek asylum status, but does not guarantee
receiving it.41
Noticeably absent from these documents is an affirmation of a positive
right to migrate. While the conventions contemplate a freedom of movement,
they are careful to set aside exceptions allowing for state sovereignty over
entrants.42 For example, the ICCPR states “the [rights to freedom of
movement] shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are
provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre
public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others. . . .”43 The
ACHR has a nearly identically worded provision.44 These broadly worded
provisions allow states to shirk the rights provided in the binding human right
conventions, as illustrated by the U.S.’s 22 year ban on HIV-positive
immigrants.45
Despite reservations by actors like the U.S.,46 the international community
has continually assumed a propensity for international movement and
migration, as demonstrated by incorporating the right to freedom of movement
into human rights and labor conventions such as the International Convention
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their
Families (“Convention on Migrant Workers”).47 The Convention on Migrant
Workers took eleven years to draft48 and concerns the protection of migrants
40

See Carter, supra note 37.
ACHR, supra note 26. The grant of asylum is legal recognition of refugee status, awarded only when
the applicant demonstrates “a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular group or political opinion.” See Refugee Convention, supra note 11, art. 1.
42 See, e.g., ACHR, supra note 26.
43 ICCPR, supra note 30, art. 12(3).
44 ACHR, supra note 26, art. 22.
45
Julia Preston, Obama Lifts a Ban on Entry into the U.S. by H.I.V.-Positive People, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
31, 2009, at A9.
46 See Carter, supra note 37; see also text accompanying note 37.
47 See UDHR, supra note 3; Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 5; ICCPR, supra note 30; ACHR,
supra note 26.
48 Bosniak, supra note 7, at 635.
41
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once they leave their home country.49 Like the UDHR, the Convention on
Migrant Workers explicitly provides for the limited rights to leave any state,
including the migrants’ state of origin, and to return to their state of origin.
However, neither the UDHR nor the Convention on Migrant Workers
expressly provides a right to enter a state.50 Nevertheless, the Convention on
Migrant Workers implies a much larger right to free movement by providing
human rights protections for both regular and irregular51 migrants.52 That is,
despite potential violations of domestic law and state sovereignty, migrant
workers are guaranteed protections regardless of their means of entry.53 The
Convention on Migrant Workers is distinct from previous International Labor
Organization (ILO) conventions in that it extends protections beyond the
migrant workers to their families54 and it includes “the entire panoply of civil,
social, economic and cultural rights.”55
Early analysts recognized that the definition of terms like “migrant worker”
and “family member” would determine the real effect of the instrument and its
impact on irregular migrants.56 Despite the name and nominally limited
purpose, the convention protects a vast majority of people residing regularly or
irregularly in countries where they are not legal residents because it covers
everyone in the country in which they reside, so long as they have worked at
any point in that country.57 These political, social, economic, cultural, and
educational rights, as well as treatment equal with that of citizens,58 are granted
regardless of whether employment was the purpose of their migration.59
However, like earlier international instruments, the convention attempts to side
step the fundamental tension in international law by explicitly retaining for
States their sovereign power to control the admission of migrants.60 Article 79
49 The Migrant Workers Convention went into force in 2003, and by January 2014, 47 states had become
parties by ratification or accession. Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 5.
50 Id. art. 8.
51 “Regular immigrant” refers to those immigrants in a country with legal documentation and permission.
“Irregular immigrants” is used instead of the pejorative “illegal immigrant” to describe migrants who have not
had their status regularized by the host state. See id. art. 5.
52 Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 5.
53 Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 5, art. 5, 7.
54 Bosniak, supra note 7, at 635.
55
Id. at 636.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 5, arts. 14, 16–19, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28, 30, 70.
59 Bosniak, supra note 7, at 636.
60 Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 5, art. 79.
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reaffirms states’ authority to maintain control over immigration and admission
policies.61 Other articles require states to take measures to end clandestine
migration and stop the employment of irregular migrants.62 The convention
also makes it clear that states are not obligated to regularize the migrants’
status,63 even while guaranteeing the rights previously mentioned.64 The
internal tension of the Convention on Migrant Workers is clear. Irregular aliens
are symbols of violated state sovereignty.65 Nevertheless the Convention on
Migrant Workers requires states to provide extensive labor, civil, and cultural
rights to irregular immigrants “while purporting to acknowledge the states’
vital interests in territorial integrity.”66
As the Convention on Migrant Workers and similar instruments struggle
with the tension between state sovereignty and extending human rights to all
migrants, they create a strange position for a migrant. On the one hand, a
migrant is free to leave their country of origin, but on the other, the migrant’s
ability to enter a different country may happen only at the permission of the
receiving state. A more accurate term granted by these international
instruments may be “freedom of departure” as opposed to freedom of
movement, since the legal movement of migrants is fundamentally constrained
by the willingness of states to receive the migrants.67 Further, the freedom of
movement is not directly tied to the cause of migration but to the domestic and
international legal framework, though the reasons for migration may have
serious impacts on the obligation of receiving states.68 For instance, countries
that have ratified the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee
Convention”) have assumed an obligation with the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to receive refugees in accordance with
the Refugee Convention and their domestic laws69 but have assumed no

61

Id.
Bosniak, supra note 7, at 637.
63 Status in the immigration context refers to the legal basis on which an immigrant is present in a
country. Regularization of status refers to the legal procedures and processes of switching from irregular (i.e.
illegal) status to a legally recognized status such as temporary worker or legal permanent resident. See e.g.,
AM. IMMIGR. LAW. ASS’N, NAVIGATING THE FUNDAMENTALS OF IMMIGRATION LAW: GUIDANCE AND TIPS FOR
SUCCESSFUL PRACTICE, 411–14 (Jill Marie Bussey et al. eds., 2014).
64
Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 5, art. 35.
65 Bosniak, supra note 7, at 637.
66 Id.
67 See e.g. Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 5, art. 79.
68 See e.g. Refugee Convention, supra note 11, art. 26.
69 Id., art. 35.
62
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obligation for individuals that fall outside the scope of the convention,
regardless of those individuals’ humanitarian need.70
B. Refugee Law
Refugee law provides protections for certain migrant populations that face
persecution.71 The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee
Convention”) defines who qualifies as a refugee:
[A]ny person who . . . owing to well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country.72

The definition does not account for “mere victims” of violence or natural
disasters73 and, as a result, has spawned efforts to expand the scope of
protection to include anyone who has lost the prerequisites for sustaining life74
including expansions to provide the “right to not be displaced”75 and
“environmental refugees.”76 Current refugee law does not provide protection
for food migrants because they do not meet the persecution requirement.77
Expansions geared toward the “right to not be displaced” focus on in situ
remedies, such as preventing governments from displacing parts of their
population for development projects,78 but in situ remedies do not help in

70 See REFUGEE CONSORTIUM, infra note 232 and accompanying text at 34 (discussing humanitarian
imperative of assisting Somali migrants during the 2011 famine).
71 See Refugee Convention, supra note 11, art. 1.
72 Refugee Convention, supra note 11, art. 1. The concept of refugee was originally introduced to handle
the displaced populations resulting from World War II, and restricted refugee status to populations displaced
prior to January 1, 1951. The definition was later expanded to include all internationally displace individuals
who met the persecution requirements. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force 4 Oct. 1967).
73 See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY,
798 (7th ed. 2012).
74 Aristide R. Zolberg, Astri Suhrke, & Sergio Aguayo, Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee
Crisis in the Developing World (1989) in THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVI A MARTIN, ET AL.,
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 797 (7th ed. 2012).
75
Stavropoulou, supra note 13, at 689.
76 See Sumudu Atapattu, Climate Change, Human Rights, and Forced Migration: Implications for
International Law, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 607 (2009); Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, Pacific Environmental Migration
in a Warming World: Is There an Obligation Beyond State Borders?, 14 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 549 (2013).
77 Refugee Convention, supra note 11, at 28.
78 Stavropoulou, supra note 13, at 701.
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situations where there is no accountable actor controlling the drivers of
migration79 and is, therefore, an inadequate focus for food migrants. Expanding
the concept of refugees to include environmental refugees helps in some but
not all situations leading to food migration.80 Part I.B.i addresses current
refugee law and the “right to not be displaced” while Part I.B.ii explores
possible expansions of the refugee definition to include environmental
refugees.
1. The Refugee Law and “The Right To Not Be Displaced”
The line between refugees and the broader class of international migrants is
notoriously difficult to draw.81 The definition of refugees has both objective
and subjective elements: the fear of persecution is a subjective measure of the
individual experience, but actual persecution must exist objectively.82 A
migrant’s ability to qualify as a refugee, and to receive the legal protections
that refugee status affords, is significantly constrained by the five categories of
persecution.83 Problematically, the common perception of refugees—
individuals fleeing famine or a war zone—often do not qualify for legal
refugee status because they do not have an objective fear of personal
persecution under one of the five categories.84 For example, in 1984, 40% of
Malians migrated out of Mali. However, because drought spurred the
migration and the Malians did not have fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, social group, or political opinion, they did not
qualify as refugees under the traditional definition.85 Similarly, Malians that
fled the country in 2012–2013 due to fighting between the Tuareg secessionists
and government forces did not qualify as refugees unless they could
demonstrate a credible fear of persecution due to political opinion, religion, or

79

See infra Part I.B.ii.
See Atapattu, supra note 76, at 631 (noting that the environmental refugee category would exclude
groups where a causal link between climate change and environmental degradation cannot be shown); see also
Environment and Heritage: Soil Degradation, NEW S. WALES GOV’T (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.
environment.nsw.gov.au/soildegradation/; SARA J SCHERR & SATYA YADAV, LAND DEGRADATION IN THE
DEVELOPING WORLD: IMPLICATIONS FOR FOOD, AGRICULTURE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT TO 2020, INT’L FOOD
POL’Y RES. INST. (1997) (recognizing land degradation as one cause of food scarcity).
81
Bosniak, supra note 7, at 634.
82 Nicole Angeline Cudiamat, Displacement Disparity: Filling the Gap of Protection for the
Environmentally Displaced Person, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 891, 922, 924 (2012).
83 See Refugee Convention, supra note 11, art. 4.
84 See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 73, at 798.
85 DIANA CARTIER, MALI CRISIS: A MIGRATION PERSPECTIVE, INT’L ORG. MIGRATION 6 (2013).
80
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other protected grounds.86 Fleeing due to fear of generalized violence does not
establish grounds for refugee status under the Refugee Convention.87 In other
words, the Refugee Convention regime does not account for “mere victims.”88
Beyond individuals fleeing from general violence, situations in which
“economic prerequisites for sustaining life have suddenly been removed
equally constitute life-threatening violence” and, some argue, should also be
considered as refugee generating conditions.89 This would include victims of
structural violence that causes starvation or victims of drought or famine,
regardless of whether compounding effects of war are present.90 Recognizing
these deficiencies, some regional conventions have further expanded the
breadth of refugee law.91 For example, the African Union grants the status of
refugee to internationally displaced people resulting from external aggression
or “events seriously disturbing public order in either part of the whole of his
country of origin or nationality.”92 The Organization of American States
similarly expanded its definition of refugee to people who fled their country
because they were threatened by “generalized violence, foreign aggression,
internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances
which have seriously disturbed public order.”93
The counter argument against such a broad expansion of refugee law is that
asylum and refugee status is a scarce political resource within the receiving
country, which should be preserved for victims of persecution.94 Under this
86

Id. at 11.
See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 73, at 798.
88 Zolberg et al, supra note 74, at 797.
89 See id.
90 See id. A close reading of international instruments seems to favor the interpretation that states have an
obligation to assist in these situations. Article 2 of the ICESCR requires states to “take steps, individually and
through international assistance and co-operation . . . to the maximum of [their] available resources . . .
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.” Combined with article 11, which recognizes a
right to an adequate standard of living including access to food, one could argue that states have a moral and
arguably legal obligation to provide assistance to “mere victims”. ICESCR, supra note 9, arts. 2, 11.
91 O.A.U. Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, art. I, Sept. 10,
1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 46 [hereinafter O.A.U. Refugee Convention].
92 Id.
93 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Nov. 22, 1984, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66/doc.10, rev. 1, art. 3 (1984–1985), 17 Apr. 1998.
94 The Refugee Convention is about the status and treatment of refugees that a state has chosen to treat as
lawfully present and does not provide an individual right to asylum. Refugee status does not guarantee a right
to permanent residence or a range of other rights guaranteed to asylum recipients but in practice the
nonrefoulment obligation (not expel or return a refugee to territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of the five protected categories) creates a de facto asylum status with all the entitlements
87
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theory, drivers of migration other than persecution are best remedied in situ
and should not be grounds for refugee status.95 In a similar vein, Maria
Stavropoulou, noted immigration and refugee scholar, argues that there exists a
qualified human right not to be displaced.96 Displacement in this context is
defined as forced, involuntary movement of people from their home or habitual
residence.97 Stavropoulou argues that the right not to be displaced fulfills seven
key requirements necessary to be considered a human right, including being a
fundamentally important social value, relevancy throughout the world, and
consistency of existing law without repetition.98 While this right addresses a
significantly broader population than the Refugee Convention, it narrowly
focuses on the countries of origin. The problem with maintaining narrow
grounds for refugee status by arguing for in situ remedies and the right not to
be displaced is that events that cause displacement are often beyond the control
of the home state or any accountable political entity.99 Even if the right not to
be displaced can be defined clearly enough to be applied, it does not provide a
remedy for the millions who are displaced but do not qualify as refugees. As
such, an alternative approach is needed to provide a remedy for non-refugee
displaced persons. One possibility is to expand the definition of refugee to
include environmental refugees.
2. Environmental Refugees As An Emerging Category
Environmental refugee refers to a group whose right not to be displaced has
been violated due to an environmental cause.100 Long-term environmental
degradation caused by growing populations, overuse of land, and poor farming
is “becoming the most pervasive and problematic form of forced migration to

enumerated in the Refugee Convention. The concern is over states losing control over admission and
permanent residence. David A. Martin, The Refugee Concept: on Definitions, Politics, and the Careful Use of
a Scarce Resource (1991) in THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 804–06 (7th ed. 2012); Refugee Convention, supra note 11, art. 33.
95 Martin, supra note 94, at 804–06.
96 Stavropoulou, supra note 13, at 89.
97 Id.; REFUGEES AND DEVELOPMENT 15 (Ernst Boesch et al. eds., 1983).
98 The other requirements are (1) eligibility for recognition as an interpretation of the U.N. Charter,
reflection of customary law, or declaration of general principles of law; (2) cable of achieving a high degree of
international consensus; (3) compatibility with the general practice of states; and (4) is precise enough to give
identifiable rights and obligations. Stavropoulou, supra note 13, at 694; Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New
Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 607, 615 (1984).
99 See infra Part I.B.2.
100 Atapattu, supra note 76, at 608.
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occur.”101 Scientists now estimate that millions of people will be displaced
from their homes because of climate change in the coming century.102 As many
as 25 million displaced people will result from environmental degradation
alone.103 Indeed, large numbers of people around the world have already been
displaced for environmental reasons, including the Yanomani in Brazil, Ogoni
in Nigeria, and Bhopal in India.104 However, despite the growing recognition
of the environment’s role in forced migrations, there is minimal to no legal
protection for people displaced because of environmental damage, mostly
because of the difficulty in defining and prohibiting the actions that cause
environmental displacement.105
Typically, environmental refugees arise from three situations:
desertification,106 rising sea levels,107 and environmental conflict.108 The idea
of environmental refugees has been gaining traction. In 1992, the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) drew distinctions between different
categories of environmental refugees, contrasting emergency situations from
slow onset situations; between temporary, extended, and permanent departure
from homelands; and between internal and international refugees.109
Subsequently, there have been numerous proposals to adopt a new Protocol on
the Recognition, Protection, and Resettlement of Environmental Refugees.110

101

Jessica B. Cooper, Environmental Refugees: Meeting the Requirements of the Refugee Definition, 6
N.Y.U. ENWRL. L.J. 480, 484 (1998); Brooke Havard, Seeking Protection: Recognition of Environmentally
Displaced Persons Under International Human Rights Law, 18 VILL. ENVT’L L.J. 65, 69–70 (2007).
102 Atapattu, supra note 76, at 636.
103 Cooper, supra note 100, at 484; Havard, supra note 101, at 70.
104 Atapattu, supra note 76, at 623; Dana Zartner, Falstrom, Stemming the Flow of Environmental
Displacement: Creating a Convention to Protect Persons and Preserve the Environment, 13 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 3 (2001).
105 Stavropoulou, supra note 13, at 690. Consider the daunting task of defining and prohibiting all of the
global factors that contribute to climate change and the subsequent rising sea levels; see Pauline Kleingeld,
Kant’s Cosmopolitan Law: World Citizenship for a Global Order, 2 KANTIAN REV. 72, 84 (1998). See
generally Tabucanon, supra note 76.
106 Desertification refers to the slow but relentless encroachment of the deserts into previously arable land
due to climate change and human-caused environmental degradation. Richard Black, Environmental Refugees:
Myth or Reality? 4 (UNHCR, Working Paper No. 34, 2011).
107 Rising sea levels will make coastal and low lying islands uninhabitable and displace populations
currently living in these regions. Tabucanon, supra note 76, at 564.
108 Environmental conflict “is the notion that environmental degradation is increasingly at the root of
conflicts that feed back into refugee movements.” Black, supra note 106, at 8.
109 Id. at 2.
110 Frank Biermann & Ingrid Boas, Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance
System to Protect Climate Refugees, 10 GLOBAL ENVTL. POLS. 60, 79 (2010).
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Critics of the environmental refugee category note that it would exclude a
large number of victims of environmental degradation where the causal link
between degradation and climate change cannot be shown.111 These critics
argue that the legal vacuum regarding environmental refugees should be
addressed generally, but it is not advisable to create an entirely new and
separate legal regime.112 Others contest the general idea of environmental
refugees as an unhelpful and intellectually unsound category.113 They view the
academic case as weak because there are various explanations for migration
and most significant studies have failed to demonstrate a linkage between
environmental degradation and migration.114
Richard Black—a noted Geographer, who is head of the School of Global
Studies at the University of Sussex and Co-Chair of the Sussex Centre for
Migration Research—disputes the premise of desertification as a cause of
environmental refugees.115 Black also disputes the idea of environmental
conflict by noting that most recent wars, like Iraq and the Congo, are more
about controlling rich resources than about resource degradation.116 He does
concede, however, that in some instances, such as Somalia, a case can be made
that environmental degradation is one of the root causes of the conflict.117
Black views the idea of environmental refugee as a “seductive” creation of
Northern policy makers who want to “restrict asylum laws and thus invented
[the term environmental refugee] at least in part to depoliticize the causes of
displacement, so enabling states to derogate their obligation to provide
111

Id. at 631.
Id. at 636.
113 See generally Black, supra note 106, at 1. By definition refugee status requires persecution and
therefore a prosecutor; the implication is that if Environmentally Displace Persons or Famine victims were to
qualify as refugees the environment would have to be recognized as the persecuting agent. See Cudiamat,
supra note 82, at 925.
114 See Black, supra note 106, at 2–3.
115 Id. at 5. Black looks to two frequently cited regions, the central Mexico and the Sahel. Id. He argues
that, in Mexico, statistics do not show a correlation between emigration and aridity (desertification), and that
there is no study showing that arid areas are necessarily degraded. Id. As for the Sahel, Black argues that
“[f]actors such as the decline of markets for traditional cash crops . . . the development of Senegal’s groundnut
basin, and subsequent mechanization of agriculture in the delta provide additional and more recent motivations
to move out of the middle and upper parts of the Senegal River Valley. Moreover, such conclusions are not
limited to the western Sahel, but can be extended across the continent.” Id.
116 See id. at 8–9.
117 “[I]n some cases, and particularly in the ‘complex political emergencies’ of the Great Lakes, Sierra
Leone/Liberia, and Somalia, environmental issues can be seen to have some relevance in the development of
hostilities, and a case can be made that environmental degradation forms an important root cause of the
conflict.” Id. at 9.
112
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asylum.”118 This analysis, however, ignores the fact that the literature mostly
argues for an extension of asylum to environmentally displaced persons.119
Black’s refutations are useful in demonstrating the difficulties presented by an
effort to expand the definition of refugee. However, they are unpersuasive
because they do not account for the fact that environmental degradation and
climate change have undoubtedly resulted in displaced populations,120 despite
the difficulty of isolating environmental changes as a driver for migration in
many circumstances.121
The discussion of environmental refugees is enlightening for two reasons.
One, it illustrates one attempt at expanding the refugee concept from strict
persecution of individuals to a broader relief for “mere victims” of rising sea
levels, environmental degradation, and environmental conflict.122 The subtle
underlying discourse involves the tension of the individual’s freedom of
movement and the sovereign state’s prerogative to close its borders.123
Assigning refugee status to a group creates a moral and legal imperative to
admit the migrant.124 Second, environmental degradation is one cause of food
scarcity125 and the resulting migration. These migrants have been forced from
their homes and, therefore, represent an obligation by states to receive migrants
who’s right not to be displaced has been violated.126
C. Human Rights
Vulnerable populations facing food scarcity are unable to achieve the most
basic human rights, such as the right to life and the right to adequate food.127
Creating a new human right—such as the positive right to migrate—may offer
a limited solution because it establishes both a moral foundation and
118

Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 11.
120 Atapattu, supra note 76, at 607.
121 Id. at 630–31.
122 See Black, supra note 106, at 8.
123 Martin, supra note 94, at 804–06.
124 Id.
125 New South Wales Government, Environment and Heritage: Soil Degradation (Sept. 26, 2013),
http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/soildegradation/. Land degradation—such as desertification—results
from improper agriculture, pastoral, or industrial use and is often exacerbated by climate change. Id. Land
degradation results in reduced yields and, if left un-remedied, will lead to abandonment of the degraded land.
See generally Sara J SCHERR & SATYA YADAV, supra note 80.
126 See e.g., ICCPR, supra note 30, art. 6.
127 See infra Part II.
119
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international legal standard to guide international behavior.128 However,
human rights have a complex history fraught with internal tension and cultural
dissonance.129 The viability of a human rights solution hinges on reframing the
dialogue from a state-centric to a people-centric approach. That is, it should
move away from an explicit focus on constraining state actions, to an approach
that focuses on the general population to establish, enforce, and obey, human
rights obligations.130
1. Evolving Concepts of Human Rights Law
Human rights are, tautologically, rights that every human is entitled to
enjoy as a function of his or her humanity.131 Most law can be described as
functioning on two congruent levels: prescriptive rules of conduct and
procedural rules.132 Similarly, rights exist on two corresponding levels.133 The
correlative of prescriptive procedural rules and duties are statutes and case
law.134 The prescriptive laws stem from underlying positive rights—divine,
natural, or ideological in origin.135 The general concept of human rights comes
from this second, higher level of natural law.136 However, the effectiveness of
protection depends directly on the liberties established in the relevant
prescriptive law.137
128 ANDREWS, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (1987) (describing how human rights
law translates moral-laden natural law into prescriptive statutory law).
129 See Makau Matua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT’L L.
J. 201 (2001) [hereinafter Savages, Victims, and Saviors].
130 See Baraka, supra note 4, at 204; Makau Matua, The Transformation of Africa. A Critique of the
Rights Discourse, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT (Felipe Gomez Isa & Koen
de Feyter, eds., 2009) [hereinafter The Transformation of Africa].
131 Abdullah Ahmed An-Na’im, Introduction: Expanding Legal Protection of Human Rights in African
Contexts, in HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REALIZING THE PROMISE FOR OURSELVES 3
(Abdullah Ahmed An-Na’im ed., 2003).
132 ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 5.
133 See id.
134 Id.
135 Id. For instance, the law “you shall not kill” is both a prescription on the act of killing and the grant of
a positive right to not be killed. The second level is the higher moral founding of these prescriptive laws. Id.
136 See Savages, Victims, and Saviors, supra note 129, at 202. To take two examples from the UDHR:
Article 1 establishes that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal” and Article 21 states that everyone “has
thethethesthethe right to take part in the government of his country.” UDHR, supra note 3, arts. 1, 21. The
equality of human beings or the superiority of democratic government are clear examples of rights do not have
their origins in codified prescriptive laws but in moral value judgments.
137 ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 6. In the United States, the equality of human beings was not achieved
until prescriptive laws—namely the 13 and 14 amendments and civil rights legislation—afforded protection to
that right. See id.
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Though not formulated as “human rights” until the creation of the UDHR
in 1948, there have been multiple historical stages of development of human
rights.138 Beginning in the Enlightenment, European philosophy was focused
on economic and political rights.139 These first generation rights were mostly
negative obligations for the government not to interfere with individual
liberties.140 They eventually expanded to include standards of justice, freedom
of trade, and expression.141 Second generation human rights focused on rights
of working class, including rights of assembly, suffrage, antidiscrimination and
the extension of rights to members of various classes, races, and genders.142
These second generation rights created a positive duty on governments to act
in order to ensure the realization of these rights.143 The third generation of
human rights development is the ongoing inclusion of socio-economic rights,
such as protection for the elderly, unemployed, destitute, and infirm, and the
obligation of providing education, and healthcare.144 However, many countries
have “balked at enshrining these as fundamental human rights.”145 These third
generation rights place an emphasis on solidarity and are most closely
associated with collectives, as opposed to the individual emphasis of first
generation Western rights.146
Within the category of third generation rights, human rights law establishes
that everyone is entitled to an adequate standard of living.147 The UDHR states
that it is the right of everyone to obtain a standard of living “adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food.”148 It is
important to note that the UDHR is a General Assembly resolution and is not a
legally binding instrument: “[i]t includes rights which have only limited legal
substance in international law . . . and it is more a statement of principle than a
treaty.”149 Nevertheless, in identical language, the International Covenant on
138

Id. at 8; see e.g., JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 76 (Thomas J. Cook ed., 1947)
(proposing a social contract between the state and citizens).
139 ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 8.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. These rights rose out of the industrial revolution and social unrest of the late 19th and early 20th
century.
143 Id.
144
Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 ICESCR supra note 9, art. 11.
148 UDHR, supra note 3, art. 25.
149 ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 11.
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Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which is a binding
agreement, affirms the rights to health and food.150 The ICESCR goes further
to state that it is “the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger,”
and calls for international cooperation in order to improve production,
conservation, and distribution of food and to educate on nutrition, as well as
reforming agrarian systems to utilize efficiently and develop natural
resources.151 The ICESCR also calls for international cooperation to balance
food import and export to “ensure and equitable distribution of world food.”152
This seems to recognize the fact that food scarcity, including famines, is a
preventable man-made occurrence resulting from poor distribution and not
from natural disasters.153 The ICESCR also implies that each state has a duty to
monitor food supplies and preventing scarcity, a duty clearly articulated in
later conventions.154
The human rights discourse emphasizes the conflict of political
philosophies and pits the first and second generational rights of the individuals
against the third generational principle of collective solidarity.155 Nevertheless,
there appears to be general agreement on a few core human rights.156 These
accepted human rights include the rights to life, liberty, freedom from slavery,
freedom from torture, due process, freedom of thought, freedom of speech, and
freedom of assembly.157 The right to life is arguably the most fundamental and
universally accepted of all human rights.158 What remains disputed is the
universality of human rights—to what extent there should be a “margin of
appreciation” that allows treatment of even these core human rights to vary
between different communities159—and if human rights can be validated
through a state-centric approach.160
150

ICESCR supra note 9, arts. 11, 12.
Id. art. 11.2(a).
152 Id. art. 11.2(b).
153 See infra Part II.A; AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND
DEPRIVATION 2 (1981) (Arguing that famines result from people not having enough food to eat due to
changing entitlements, not due to actual food scarcity in the market).
154 See Food Assistance Convention, arts. 2, 4, C.N.215.2012.TREATIES-XIX.48 (May 9, 2012); see also
infra Part III.
155 ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 23.
156
Id. at 26.
157 Id.
158 Id.; see e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (New York, 9
Dec. 1948) 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) (144 states are parties to the convention).
159 ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 24.
160 See Baraka, supra note 4.
151
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2. The Movement Toward People-Centric Human Rights
The value of international human rights standards, aside from helping
establish customary international law, is that they are legally binding and
universally valid on all states that have ratified the relevant treaty.161 Human
rights law is state-centric, focusing on constraining state action and relying on
states to self-regulate and enforce the international doctrine.162 The law affords
fundamental rights and freedoms to all persons subject to the jurisdiction of the
state, making human rights “a matter of state responsibility, [which] means that
an injury or harm is not a human rights violation unless the state is implicated
in its happening.”163 Human rights law is composed of binding treaties that are
negotiated by states that intend to respect the rights set forth.164
The state-centric structure of human rights is cogent since all of
international law is organized around the fundamental concept of state
sovereignty.165 However, a state-centric approach is ill-equipped to handle
human rights for two reasons. First, socio-economic interdependence and
political interactions now regularly transcend national borders.166 Since the
enshrinement of human rights in the UDHR, there has been a marked growth
of international activities—like global climate change and refugees—that
cannot be regulated by a single state.167 Additionally, there has been a
staggering growth in international actors, such as international nongovernmental organizations, and transnational corporations, which are not
recognized by the state-centric international human rights law.168 Second,
human rights should represent the rights of all humans, but the formalization of
human rights in the state-centric system resulted in a few powerful states

161

An-Na’im, supra note 131, at 1.
Id.; see also Savages, Victims, and Saviors, supra note 129, at 211 (noting that the UDHR represented
“the first time [that] the major powers drew a line demarcating impermissible conduct by states toward their
own people and created the concept of collective responsibility for human rights”).
163
An-Na’im, supra note 131, at 1.
164 Savages, Victims, and Saviors, supra note 129, at n.76. For example, the ICCPR sets forth the rights of
the individual and then declares the intent to bind the parties, stating: “[e]ach State Party. . . undertakes to
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in
the present Covenant.” Id. (quoting ICCPR, supra note 30, art. 2).
165
Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, supra note 21, at 1 (1994). Sovereignty is defined as the
principle that each state is the master of its own territory except where limited by treaties or international law.
Id.
166 See id. at 1–2.
167 Id. at 6.
168 Id. at 7.
162
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bequeathing their rights framework to the rest of the world,169 as opposed to
the bulk of humanity declaring these (or other) rights for themselves.170 The
result is a lack of universal acceptance that threatens to cripple the human
rights system.171
Because the foundation of human rights lies in a moral grounding, and
because there are few rules that have received universal moral acceptance,
there is no universal agreement on the exact content of Human Rights.172
Nevertheless, for most of the human rights establishment the universality of
human rights—including the assumptions, values, and legal framework—is
seen as “a natural evolution of progressive global relations” and is
uncontested.173 In many ways this is a gross mischaracterization that ignores
the influences of power, race, and ideology.174 The body of human rights law is
fundamentally Eurocentric and stems from a time when Western, white
supremacist, colonial, capitalist, and patriarchal states dominated the
international community.175
As noted human rights scholar Makau Mutua points out, it is “[p]recisely
because of this cultural and historical context, [that] the human rights
movement’s basic claim of universality is undermined.”176 For example, only
“individuals who have suffered specific abuses arising from the state’s
transgression of internationally recognized human rights [such as] an
individual subjected to torture by a state” are treated as victims, “whereas a
person who dies of starvation due to famine or suffers malnutrition for lack of
a balanced diet is not regarded as a human rights victim.”177 Matua highlights
an important element of the current human rights regime that drives at the heart
of violations faced by food migrants: the system first defines who is a victim of
human rights abuses and then seeks to reconstruct societies to reduce the

169

See Austen L. Parrish, Rehabilitating Territoriality in Human Rights, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1099, 1109

(2011).
170

See Baraka, supra note 4.
The Transformation of Africa, supra note 130, at 899.
172 ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 6; Savages, Victims, and Saviors, supra note 129, at 206 (“What, for
example, are fundamental human rights, and how are they determined? Do such rights have cultural, religious,
ethical, moral, political, or other biases?”).
173 Baraka, supra note 4.
174 Id.
175 Id.; Savages, Victims, and Saviors, supra note 129, at 204.
176 Savages, Victims, and Saviors, supra note 129, at 204–05.
177 Id. at n.11.
171
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number of victims only of the type that it recognizes.178 This narrow definition
of victim highlights the second-class status of economic and social rights
within the human rights discourse.179
The Western traditions emphasize political and civil liberties of the
individual, as well as the right to life and property.180 However, for people
lacking a fundamental means of survival, traditional Western rights pale in
significance to rights that guarantee the basic necessities.181 Therefore, it may
be “morally repugnant” to place the Western rights above economic or social
rights.182 This distinction shows the sharp divide between the West, or global
North, and the global South on the content of human rights.183
Legitimization of the human rights regime requires a participatory, bottomup process that is driven by the experiences of the afflicted.184 Further,
collectives and communities are integral to the functioning of many societies
around the world.185 If human rights are going to enjoy universal legitimacy,
the Western individualist focus must be “tempered with communalist or group
oriented approaches”186 that provide for third generation human rights. The
current system fails to wrestle with the underlying economic and political
philosophy and indirectly sanctions political democracy and free market
capitalism.187 Critically, the current system wrongly equates achieving human
dignity with containing despotism and therefore seeks a society that avoids
political tyranny but makes no effort to remedy economic tyranny.188
Economic powerlessness must be addressed.189
This again emphasizes a startling dichotomy. Countries may recognize the
right to life but not recognize economic rights. Yet economic and social rights
are necessary for one to earn enough, or grow enough food, to survive. Is
access to food the equivalent of a right to life or, because it is removed by the
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

Id. at 203.
Id. at n.11.
ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Baraka, supra note 4.
The Transformation of Africa, supra note 130, at 899.
Id.
Id. at 922.
Id.
Id.

STEPHENS GALLEYSPROOFS2

2014]

12/3/2014 8:58 AM

ESTABLISHING A POSITIVE RIGHT

201

necessity of work (either by subsistence agriculture or earning enough money
to buy food), is it “merely” an economic right?190 If access to food is an
economic right that is not valued by the West, then the fundamental right to
life is a misnomer. It is not a positive right to life, but rather freedom from a
state arbitrarily taking one’s life. However, if the former is true, and access to
food stands on par with a right to life, secondary questions are raised: is the
right to migrate due to food scarcity an individual right, a collective right, a
political right, an economic right, or some combination thereof and how does
this influence the ability to migrate between states and the obligation of
receiving states?
Since food scarcity has social, economic, political, and environmental
causes,191 this Comment argues that the right to migrate due to food scarcity is
a complex amalgamation of these human rights categories. However, trying to
categorize this proposed right into the old generational distinctions is like
trying to force a square peg into a round hole. Much of the confusion is due to
the state-centered treaty process that creates a “top-down and conservative
understanding of available human rights.”192 There is no problem translating
the global ideals to local realities if the structural process is inverted.193
Reversing the perspective, it is easy to see that if there is a right to life, then
access to food is a corollary right of equal importance and any hindrance to
food access is a violation of that right, regardless of whether the cause is
political, civil, economic, or social.
To analyze the right to migrate based on food scarcity, the right must be
removed from the theoretical and placed in the actual. An examination of
famine situations and economic-driven food scarcity provide a means to
delineate the scope of the right to migrate based on food scarcity.

190
191
192
193

See infra Part II.
Id.
Baraka, supra note 4.
Id.

STEPHENS GALLEYSPROOFS2

202

12/3/2014 8:58 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

II. EXAMINING GLOBAL SITUATIONS OF FOOD SCARCITY: FAMINES AND THE
DISPLACEMENT OF SMALL FARMERS.
Famines present a particularly stark and mortal form of food scarcity.194
However, famines have significant economic underpinnings, and it is not
always easy to draw the line between famine and less extreme forms of food
scarcity.195 Part II examines the general causes of famine-type food scarcity,
two situations of food migration, and the reactions of the primary receiving
state. Section A discusses Somalia, a country that faced a famine in 2011, in
which more than a 150,000 people migrated to Kenya.196 Section B focuses on
Paraguay and the complex relationship with its neighboring states that has
created food scarcity for small farmers and driven many to migrate to
Argentina.197 The drivers of Paraguayan rural migration are examined,
followed by a brief look of the liberalization of Argentine immigration laws.
A. Famine Situations and the Case of the 2011 Somali Famine
Famines present an extreme food scarcity situation where the right to life is
unambiguously threatened. Despite the clear humanitarian threat presented by
famines, their causes are not solely political, environmental or economic,
which makes addressing famines particularly difficult within the current
refugee or human rights regimes. Part II.A.i explores the intricacies of the
causes of famines. Part II.A.ii addresses the Somali Famine of 2011 and the
Kenyan response, showing that the displaced populations occupy an
ambiguous status somewhere between economic migrants and environmental
refugees.
1. Understanding Famines
To the mind of most Westerners, the word famine conjures images of dry
fields and starving subsistence farmers. However, famine is often a man-made,

194 SEN, supra note 153, at 40. It is estimated that 260,000 Somalis died from the 2011 famine, half of
them under the age of six. Associated Press, Somalia: Famine Toll in 2011 Was Larger Than Previously
Reported, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/30/world/africa/somalia-famine-tollin-2011-was-larger-than-previously-reported.html.
195 SEN, supra note 153, at 162.
196 I.O.M. Appeals for US $26 Million, supra note 16.
197 See infra Part II.B.i.
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and therefore avoidable, phenomenon.198 While a full examination of the
causes of famine exceeds the scope of this Comment, a secondary effect of
famine is the tendency for communities to migrate away from the affected
areas.199 Therefore, a general understanding of the factors that cause faminerelated migration assists in understanding how famine victims fit within the
international migration framework.
Famine is a widespread, extreme, and protracted shortage of food that often
results in starvation.200 A lack in the actual quantity of food is only one
possible cause of famines.201 Professor Amartya Sen views famines as
economic disasters, not just food crisis,202 noting that starvation results from
people not having enough food to eat, which does not necessarily equate with
there not being enough to eat.203 The extent to which food supply influences
famine and starvation is dependent upon entitlement relations204 that determine
the distribution of food between different parts of the community.205 The
mismanagement of food distribution can create famine.206 The ECESCR,
which calls for governments to cooperate in the equal distribution of food,
apparently recognizes this reality.207
198 See Cudiamat, supra note 82, at 922; Andrew E. Shacknove, Who is a Refugee?, 95 ETHICS 274, 279–
80 (Jan. 1995).
199 See generally SEN, supra note 153, at 56, 87–88, 119. During the Great Bengal Famine of 1942–43
there was mass peasant immigration to Calcutta; at the peak of the Ethiopian Famine of 1972–74, 60,000
people had migrated to Addis Ababa and were living refugee camps; the famines which plagued the Sahel in
1972–1973 drove the pastoral population to camps in the South. Id.
200 Id. at n.2 (reporting that various scholars define famine as: (1) “food shortage [that] is either
widespread or extreme if not both, and that the degree of extremity is best measured by human mortality from
starvation;” (2) “[a]n extreme and protracted shortage of food resulting in widespread and persistent hunger,
evidenced by loss of body weight and emaciation and increase in the death rate caused either by starvation or
disease resulting from the weakened condition of the population;” and (3) “an economic and social
phenomenon characterized by the widespread lack of food resources which, in the absence of outside aid, leads
to death of those affected.”).
201 Id. at 162.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 1. But see Peter Bowbrick, The Causes of Famine: A refutation of Professor Sen’s Theory, FOOD
POLICY, 105 (May 1986) (using the Bengali Famine to contest Sen’s “demand side analysis”).
204 Exchange entitlement is the bundle of commodities that an individual can acquire in exchange for what
he owns. Exchange occurs either through trading, production, or a combination of the two. Exchange
entitlements are determined by (1) if an individual can find employment, at what wage and for how long; (2)
what he can earn by selling non-labor assets; (3) what he can produce on his own; (4) the cost of purchasing
resources and the value of the products he can sell; and (5) social security benefits and entitlements and the
cost of taxes. SEN, supra note 153, at 3–4.
205 I.O.M. Appeals for US$ 26 Million, supra note 16.
206 Shacknove, supra note 198, at 922.
207 ICESCR, supra note 9, art. 11.2(b).
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Famine-driven migrants are not always permanent “refugees,” even in the
broad sense of the word.208 Many Ethiopians in the 1970s avoided
institutionally distributed relief and “feeding points” that would have
potentially resulted in large numbers of permanent internally displaced persons
or “refugees,” and returned to their homelands when the crisis passed.209
Similarly, the people that migrated south during the Sahel droughts and
famines of the 1970s returned north afterwards.210 As Professor Sen notes, the
problem for the Sahel is one of fluctuating economic circumstance between
wet and dry years, as opposed to a complete collapse of economic potential in
the North.211 In both cases, the vulnerable populations did not suffer from
persecution as defined in the Refugee Convention and, therefore, did not
qualify as refugees under international law.212 Nevertheless, in most situations,
the government’s inability to support famine victims directly enhances the
vulnerability of environmental and economic refugees that are forced to
relocate because of a shortage of food.213
In Africa, food shortages have traditionally been attributed to four factors:
inadequate education of African farmers, low consumer prices for agricultural
products, unstable political climate, and growing population.214 Both the first
and fourth factors address farmers’ actual ability to produce sufficient food for
the population, but in most famines it is the distribution, not the food quantity,
which is the underlying culprit for shortages.215 African governments have
historically been criticized for implementing self-defeating policies that
promote low consumer prices for food, which provides “little incentive for the
primary producers, the small African farmers, to contribute to agricultural
output even when weather conditions are favorable, since their crops will not
yield profits.”216 Yet the food price crisis of 2008217 was not beneficial to rural
208

Black, supra note 106. In fact they do not qualify for any refugee status because they are not the
victims of persecution. See supra Part I.B.
209 Black, supra note 106, at 6.
210 SEN, supra note 153, at 124.
211 Id.
212 See Refugee Convention, supra note 11.
213 Cudiamat, supra note 82, at 922.
214 Joy A Weber, Famine Aid to Africa: An International Legal Obligation, 15 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 369,
373 (1989).
215 See Cudiamat, supra note 82, at 922.
216 Weber, supra note 214, at 374–75.
217 The economic down turn of 2008 caused global food prices to rise by 25%, with the price of corn
doubling from the price in 2006 and wheat prices reaching a 28-year high. The World Food Crisis, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 10, 2008) available at, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/10/opinion/10thu1.html.

STEPHENS GALLEYSPROOFS2

2014]

12/3/2014 8:58 AM

ESTABLISHING A POSITIVE RIGHT

205

households because, despite also being producers, many rural households are
net purchasers of staple food.218 In fact, pastoralists, small farmers, ranked
among the most adversely affected populations.219 This leaves the third factor,
which most significantly implicates the obligation of governments to ensure
access to food.
2. The 2011 Somali Famine and Kenya’s Response
In the summer of 2011, famine was declared in five parts of southern
Somalia.220 The famine was partially the result of a severe regional drought
that also affected parts of Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti,221 increased food
prices,222 and al-Shabaab militants preventing food deliveries.223 Ongoing
fighting between Somali militias and the Transitional Federal Government
since May 2009 had resulted in increasing levels of displacement and made
humanitarian assistance difficult.224 As a result, many Somalis sought refuge
and relief in Kenya and Ethiopia.225 At the peak of the migration,
approximately 1,400 Somalis arrived in Kenya each day.226 The IOM and its
partners transported 100,000 dehydrated and starved Somalis from the border
to camps in Kenya and Ethiopia.227

218

PAUL HARVEY, KAREN PROUDLOCK, EDWARD CLAY, BARRY RILEY, & SUSANNE JASPARS, FOOD AID
FOOD ASSISTANCE IN EMERGENCY AND TRANSITIONAL CONTEXTS: A REVIEW OF CURRENT THINKING, 7
(Humanitarian Policy Group, June 2010).
219 Other significantly affected populations were the rural landless, displaced persons, and urban poor. Id.
220 I.O.M. Appeals for US$ 26 Million, supra note 16.
221 Id.
222 Horn of Africa Famine, UNICEF http://www.unicefusa.org/work/emergencies/horn-of-africa/ (last
visited Feb. 12, 2014).
223 Associated Press, Somalia: Famine Toll in 2011 Was Larger Than Previously Reported, NEW YORK
TIMES (Apr. 29, 2013) http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/30/world/africa/somalia-famine-toll-in-2011-waslarger-than-previously-reported.html.
224 Somalia Country Profile, INT’L ORG. MIGRATION (Aug. 2014) www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/
where-we-work/africa-and-the-middle-east/east-africa/somalia-1/somalia-country-profile.html.
225 I.O.M. Appeals for US$ 26 Million, supra note 16.
226
Thirty Thousand Somalis Given Shelter as IOM Pitches Last Tents at Camp in Kenya, INT’L ORG.
MIGRATION (Dec. 16, 2011), https://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/news-and-views/press-briefingnotes/pbn-2011/pbn-listing/thirty-thousand-somalis-given-shelter-as.html.
227 100,000 Displaced Somalis Assisted By IOM To Reach Camps In Kenya And Ethiopia Since The
Influx, INT’L ORG. MIGRATION (Jan. 31, 2012), http://appablog.wordpress.com/2012/01/31/100000-displacedsomalis-assisted-by-iom-to-reach-camps-in-kenya-and-ethiopia-since-the-influx/.
AND
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Somalia presents an interesting and difficult case study because it is, in
effect, a failed state.228 While there is a preference in the international
community for in situ solutions for food crises,229 it is clear that no such
remedies are available in Somalia.230 However, the famine provides an
opportunity to examine the international response to famine “refugees.”
Around 152,000 Somalis fled to the Dadaab refugee camp in eastern Kenya.231
Kenya has been providing asylum to regional refugees for decades and
Dadaab—the world’s largest refugee camp—houses the largest Somali
population outside of Somalia.232 Kenya’s legal obligations to refugees are
clear: Kenya ratified both the 1951 Refugee convention and the 1969 OAU
convention without reservations.233 In addition, the Kenyan constitution
integrates the “general rules of international law” as part of Kenyan law234 and
the constitution’s Bill of Rights provide civil, political, economic, cultural, and
group rights to all persons.235
Prior to 2006, Kenya had no refugee-specific laws.236 In 1992, on the
invitation of the Kenyan government, the UNHCR assumed responsibility for
refugee protection in Kenya, including determinations of status.237 The
UNHCR recognized two classes of refugees: (1) mandate refugees, who
constituted all refugees that had undergone some form of individual status
determination; and (2) prima facie refugees based on regions suffering from
generalized conflict, notably Somalia and Sudan.238 When Kenya passed the
2006 Refugee Act and assumed responsibility for refugee administration, it
228 See MARY HARPER, GETTING SOMALIA WRONG?: FAITH, WAR, AND HOPE IN A SHATTERED STATE 105–06 (2012) (defining failed state as one “that can no longer perform its basic security and development
functions and that has no effective control over its territory and borders.”).
229 See INT’L ORG. MIGRATION, MIGRANTS IN TIMES OF CRISIS: AN EMERGING PROTECTION CHALLENGE,
INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE ON MIGRATION 4 (2012) (“First, States bear the primary responsibility to protect
and assist crisis-affected persons residing on their territory.”) [hereinafter MIGRANTS IN TIMES OF CRISIS].
230 See HARPER, supra note 228, at 104–06.
231 Int’l Org. Migration, Migration Mapping Service between Somalia and Dadaab in Kenya Highlights
Need for Better Protection of Drought and Famine Victims, RELEIFWEB (Nov. 22, 2011), http://reliefweb.int/
report/kenya/migration-mapping-service-between-somalia-and-dadaab-kenya-highlights-need-better
[hereinafter Migration Mapping Service].
232 REFUGEE CONSORTIUM OF KENYA, ASYLUM UNDER THREAT: ASSESSING THE PROTECTION OF SOMALI
REFUGEES IN DADAAB REFUGEE CAMPS AND ALONG THE MIGRATION CORRIDOR 9 (2012).
233
Id. at 7.
234 CONSTITUTION, art. 2, §5 (2010) (Kenya).
235 See CONSTITUTION, art. 26–51 (2010) (Kenya).
236 REFUGEE CONSORTIUM OF KENYA, supra note 232, at 20.
237 Id.
238 Id.
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maintained the mandate and prima facie distinctions.239 Historically, most
Somali refugees have cited conflict as their motivation for fleeing, but a survey
of the newly arrived Somali “refugees” found that 43% had come to the camp
predominately as a result of the drought and famine, 240 which does not
comport with the legal requirements of the Refugee Convention.241 There is
concern that these new “refugees” may undermine the prima facie refugee
status of Somali immigrants.242
Despite their ambiguous status, “[o]ther rights - housing, health, food, safe
and adequate drinking water–[were] provided as part of the humanitarian
assistance for refugees” though they were not always sufficient.243 Due to the
regional conflict, Kenya closed its border with Somalia in 2007 and maintained
the closure throughout the 2011 crisis.244 Yet Kenya made no effort to stop
famine refugees from crossing in 2011, which some view as “a tacit
recognition of the overwhelming humanitarian imperative of the famine.”245
However, knowledge of the border closure led many Somalis to use unofficial
crossing points because they believed that Kenyan officials would refuse them
entry.246
The Somali example shows that, while famines present a clear need for
humanitarian aid, the displaced populations occupy an ambiguous status
somewhere between economic migrants and environmental refugees.
Additionally, Somalia clearly demonstrates a situation where in situ remedies
to food scarcity are simply not available. The international community and
239 The Mandate’s refugee definition was expanded beyond the Refugee Convention to include sex as a
ground for persecution. The Prima Facie definition was changed to the language in the expanded OAU
Convention definition that includes “events seriously disturbing public order” REFUGEE CONSORTIUM OF
KENYA, supra note 232, at 21.
240 Id. at 42.
241 See supra Part I.
242 REFUGEE CONSORTIUM OF KENYA, supra note 232, at 10.
243 Id. at 30.
244 Id. at 34.
245 Id. at 34.
246 This lengthened the trip for many Somalis and contributed to excess mortality from the famine. IOM
Finds Life Threatening Conditions on the Road to Dadaab; Responds to Emergency in Ethiopia’s Refugee
Camps, INT’L ORG. MIGRATION (Jul. 29, 2011), https://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/news-andviews/press-briefing-notes/pbn-2011/pbn-listing/iom-finds-life-threatening-conditions-on.html.
See
also
REFUGEE CONSORTIUM OF KENYA, supra note 232, at 88 (“In the context of the 2011 famine and refugee crisis,
the continued refusal by the Government of Kenya to open the border, lack of access to nutrition, health, water
and transport facilities at Liboi was an egregious protection failure, contributing for several months to excess
mortality in the first days of arrival in the camps.”).
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Kenya sought to protect the Somalis basic human rights, in accordance with
international law.247 However, with no legal recognition of their status, the
famine refugees face possible refoulement to Somalia at any time.248
B. The Positive Right to Migrate: The Case of Paraguay and Argentina
Paraguay is a small country in the heart of South America and has a large
agrarian society.249 It is one of only 16 countries in the world where the level
of malnutrition since 1990 has not declined.250 According to the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 26–33% of the population
suffers from undernourishment.251 Facing food insecurity and a breakdown of
the traditional agrarian society—due in large part to Brazilian immigration into
Paraguay—many Paraguayans are migrating to Argentina.252 Part II.B.i
provides an overview of the factors that create structural poverty among rural
Paraguayans and drive their migration to Argentina. Part II.B.ii discusses the
Argentine response to Paraguayan migration as a model for a positive right to
migrate.
1. Paraguayan History and Migration
To understand regional migration and the relationship between Paraguay,
Argentina, and Brazil, one must begin with the Triple Alliance War of the
1860s.253 The war decimated the Paraguayan population and led the post-war
government to pursue a policy of agricultural colonization by immigrants with
the purpose of repopulating the country;254 the promotion of agrarian
247 MIGRANTS IN TIMES OF CRISIS, supra note 226, at 5 (“all migrants, irrespective of their status, are
entitled to the full protection of their human rights by the mere virtue of their humanity.”).
248 REFUGEE CONSORTIUM OF KENYA, supra note 232, at 88.
249 See THE WORLD FACT BOOK: PARAGUAY, C.I.A., https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/pa.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2014).
250 Hunger Map, supra note 1.
251 The level of undernourishment rises to 33%, the second highest level in Latin America, if calculated
based the actual caloric expenditures due to average daily physical activity. FOOD SECURITY INDICATORS,
FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. U.N. (Dec. 2013), http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/ess-fs/ess-fadata/en/#.UuMmEW
Qo41I; Paraguay, FAOSTAT http://faostat.fao.org/CountryProfiles/Country_Profile/Direct.aspx?lang=en&
area=169 (last visited Jan. 24, 2014).
252
See generally PARAGUAY MIGRATION PROFILE, supra note 14, at 3.
253 The origins of the war are beyond the scope of this paper but it was the bloodiest war in South
American history and occurred between Paraguay and a triple alliance of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, ending
in 1870. War of the Triple Alliance, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/
topic/442711/War-of-the-Triple-Alliance (last visited Jan. 23, 2014).
254 PARAGUAY MIGRATION PROFILE, supra note 14, at 3.
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immigration continued through the twentieth century.255 Beginning in the
1960s, there was a large influx of Brazilian immigrants into Paraguay. 256 Like
the Green Revolution occurring elsewhere in the world, the Brazilians
consolidated a model of agricultural and livestock production that depended on
a high level of technological inputs and low demand for manual laborers.257 In
1996, Paraguay updated its immigration law but made no reference to the
problems of Brazilian immigration.258 Instead, the new law continued with the
centuries-old policy, explicitly stating that its goal was to encourage (1) the
immigration of foreigners with capital to establish small and medium
businesses, and (2) immigration of farmers to colonize parts of the country, to
diversify agricultural production, and to incorporate new technologies.259
The immigration law resulted in extensive monoculture and market
domination by mostly Brazilian transnational corporations.260 The profit and
the production of Paraguayan agriculture increased without increasing labor
demands.261 The result was the displacement of small and medium Paraguayan
farmers who rely on subsistence agriculture, supplemented by some small
market sales.262 These farmers had fewer resources than the multinationals and
were unable to compete, contributing to the increase of internal and
international emigration.263
Additionally, the emphasis by Brazilian and multinational owned
agribusiness in Paraguay (often termed “Braziguayos”) on exportable
commodities was a substantial change in the model of production of the
country and occurred at a high environmental cost.264 The new emphasis on
large mono-crops resulted in massive deforestation, increased air pollution, and
destruction of watersheds due to agrochemicals.265 In some instances, entire
255

Id.
Id. at 11.
257 Id.
258 Ley No. 978/1996 De Migraciones [Law No. 978/1996 Of Migrations], Art. 2(b), (c) (Para.).
259 Id.
260 PARAGUAY MIGRATION PROFILE, supra note 14, at 12.
261 Id.
262 PARAGUAY MIGRATION PROFILE, supra note 14, at 36.
263
Id. at 3.
264 Agronegocios, Acaparamiento de Tierras y Transgénicos Detrás del Golpe de Estado en Paraguay
[Agribusiness, Land Grabbing and Transgenics behind the Coup in Paraguay], CENTRO DE DOCUMENTACIÓN
Y ESTUDIOS [CTR. FOR DOCUMENTATION AND RES.] (Jun 25, 2012) http://www.cde.org.py/web/index.php/
noticias/72-agronegocios-acaparamiento-de-tierras-y-transgenicos-detras-del-golpe-de-estado-en-paraguay.
265 Id.
256

STEPHENS GALLEYSPROOFS2

210

12/3/2014 8:58 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

communities were poisoned and displaced due to aggressive spraying of agrotoxins.266 In addition to displacement and emigration, the influx of Brazilians
and Argentines has spurred a relatively large social justice movement, which
operates outside of the government and attempts to create in situ remedies by
addressing land use, continuing displacement of Paraguayan rural farmers, and
environmental degradation.267
Nevertheless, the century-and-a-half of promoted agriculture colonization
has generated the most unequal land distribution in the world.268 Recent
surveys place approximately 85% of the total land in Paraguay in the hands of
2% of the landowners.269 The factors that create structural poverty in Paraguay
are causes for migration.270 Economic production in Paraguay is fundamentally
based on agricultural activity and exports.271 In 2009, the rate of
underemployment hovered around 25% of the population, and 22% in rural
areas.272 Paraguay was ranked as the 13th highest inequality of income in the

266

See MICHAEL ANTONIOU, ET AL., GM SOY: SUSTAINABLE? RESPONSIBLE?, 25 (2010), http://gmwatch.
eu/images/pdf/gm_full_eng_v15.pdf (finding about 9,000 rural families are evicted by soy production each
year, by armed eviction or aerial spraying of toxic pesticides close to homes.); see also Stephanie Williamson,
Rural Communities in Paraguay Endangered by Soya Pesticides, PESTICIDE ACTION NETWORK – UK (Sept.
2008), http://www.pan-uk.org/pestnews/Issue/pn81/pn81_p12-15.pdf. In eight communities studied, 78% of
families suffered from pesticide-related illnesses and 60% were displaced from their land do to agrochemical
contamination of water sources. Id.
267 See e.g., Movimiento Campesino Paraguayo [Paraguayan Peasant Movement], http://www.okarayguaparaguai.org/es/; Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones de Mujeres Trabajadores Rurales e Indiginas
(Conamuri) [National Coordinator of Organizations of Working Rural and Indigenous Women], http://
conamuri.org.py/index.html.
268 CONAMURI, PARAGUAY: GOLPE DE ESTADO Y ASESINATOS. MULTINACIONALES DEL AGRONEGOCIO Y
RESISTENCIA CAMPESINA [PARAGUAY: COUP AND MURDERS, MULTINATIONAL AGRIBUSINESS AND PEASANT
RESISTANCE] (Jan. 2013), http://www.grain.org/fr/article/entries/4642-paraguay-golpe-de-estado-y-asesinatosmultinacionales-del-agronegocio-y-resistencia-campesina.
269 Centro De Documentación y Estudios, supra note 264.
270
Paulo Lopez, El éxodo paraguayo: sus causas y consecuencias [The Paraguayan Exodus: Its Causes
and Consequences], E’A (Mar. 7, 2012), ea.com.py/el-exodo-paraguayo-sus-causas-y-consecuencias/.
271 Agriculture made up 34.3% of the labor employment in the country in 2002 and 29.5% in 2009. Id.;
Agriculture made up 34.3% of the labor employment in the country in 2002 and 29.5% in 2013. PARAGUAY
MIGRATION PROFILE, supra note 14, at 20.
272 Id. at 22.
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world, with a GINI coefficient of 53.2 in 2009,273 and has the lowest per capita
income in the region.274
The issue of land distribution and territorial control by Brazilian
immigrants are clear engines of Paraguayan migration.275 The advance of
agribusiness occurs at the expense of adaptive farming models by rural
Paraguayans, resulting in an expulsion from their land.276 Some of the
migrations are to internal urban centers, but those areas are already saturated,
impoverished, lacking even the minimum sanitation in parts.277 Furthermore, it
is almost impossible for an uneducated farmer to find adequate and dignified
work278 so many displaced Paraguayans turn their sights abroad. Estimates
from 2010 indicate that around 777,000 Paraguayans, about 12% of the total
population, have emigrated.279 Of that, almost 73% have migrated to
Argentina.280 The origin of the migrants is telling—about half of the
Paraguayan immigrants came from rural areas, and around 25% come from
just two of the departments that received a large number of Braziguayo
immigrants.281
The chain of Paraguayan migration is complex. A centuries-old national
policy opened the country up to outside colonization, mechanized agriculture,
and an export-based economy resulting in displacement of small to medium
Paraguayan farmers who substantially rely on subsistence agriculture.282
Displacement results not only in a loss of home but a loss of access to food.
273 A GINI coefficient measures the extent to which household income and consumption deviates from
perfectly equal distribution, where 0 signifies perfect equality and 100 signifies perfect inequality. Of the 136
countries with available data, South Africa is the most unequal with a coefficient of 63.1 (2005), Sweden is the
most equal with 23.0 (2005), and the U.S. ranks 46 with a coefficient of 45.0 (2007). GINI index, THE WORLD
BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI (last visited Jan. 23, 2014); C.I.A., supra note 249.
274 PARAGUAY MIGRATION PROFILE, supra note 14, at 14.
275 See Lopez, supra note 270 (noting how land sales and the establishment of foreign farms in the 1970s
post-war period provoked the emigration of an evicted Paraguayan population); see also PARAGUAY
MIGRATION PROFILE, supra note 14, at 12 (stating that subsequent to the opening of the “agriculture frontier,”
immigrants were predominately Brazilian).
276 PARAGUAY MIGRATION PROFILE, supra note 14, at 19; Resoluciones del 10 Congreso del MCP
[Resolutions of the 10th Congress of the Paraguayan Peasant Movement], MCP (Oct. 26, 2010),
www.okaraygua-paraguai.org/news/es_ES/2010/10/26/0001/resoluciones-del-10o-congreso-del-mcp.
277
PARAGUAY MIGRATION PROFILE, supra note 14, at 19.
278 Id.
279 Id. at 4.
280 Id. at 35.
281 Id. at 36.
282 Id. at 11, 36.
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Not only can these displaced individuals no longer support themselves through
subsistence agriculture but also, in many cases, they are unable to find
employment sufficient to feed themselves and their families.283 The result is a
large migratory population seeking employment abroad.284 While this clearly
represents a crisis in food access, the displaced Paraguayans do not fall neatly
into the refugee framework.285 Some have been displaced because their land
was surrounded and eventually purchased by multinational corporations.
Others were physically forced off their land, while others faced economic
dislocation because of their inability to compete in the new market.286 The
failure of in situ remedies and the unavailability of remedies within the current
refugee framework indicate that a new approach is needed to provide
protection to Paraguayan immigrants and others similarly situated. Establishing
a positive right to migrate provides a potential alternative and the Argentine
response to Paraguayan migrants illustrates how a positive right to migrate
may look.
2. Argentina’s Immigrants and Immigration Law
Like most countries in South America, Argentina was subject to a military
dictatorship during the 1960s, 1970s and into the 1980s.287 During the
dictatorship, the Argentinians suffered severe human rights abuses and many
people were tortured and later “disappeared.”288 As a result of this oppressive
history, the democratic Argentina that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s
incorporated international law into the bedrock of the Argentine legal
system.289 Notably, the new constitution held that all international treaties are
superior to domestic laws and elevated several human rights treaties to
constitutional status.290
In accordance with this incorporation of international human rights into
Argentine domestic law, Argentina revised its immigration law and passed
283

Id. at 19.
Id. at 4.
285 See supra Part I.B.
286 See ANTONIOU, supra note 266; PARAGUAY MIGRATION PROFILE, supra note 14, at 3; Williamson,
supra note 266.
287 Janet Kovin Levit, The Constitutionalization of Human Rights in Argentina: Problem or Promise?, 37
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 281, 288 (1999).
288 Id. at 288–89.
289 Id. at 283, 288.
290 Id.
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Law 25.871 in 2004.291 This was the first time the immigration law had been
revised since the military dictatorship and represented a major step in
increasing immigrant rights.292 While the law improved the status of
immigrants generally, the most significant change was to establish migration as
a fundamental right.293 Under the title “Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners,”
Article 4 reads: “[t]he right of migration is an essential and inalienable
individual right and the Republic of Argentina guarantees this right based in
the principles of equality and universality.”294
The incorporation of the right to migrate, as opposed to a limited freedom
of movement, is not found in immigration laws of other large immigrantreceiving countries or explicitly in any human rights conventions.295 This
concept has found traction elsewhere in the region as well.296 The Argentine
immigration law blends the fundamental concepts of human rights with
immigration. Not only does the law establish open borders and the right to
migrate, but also grants rights to healthcare access and private and public
education, regardless of immigration status.297 The law also gives migrants a
right of family reunion, providing for the immigration of children, spouses, and
parents of migrants already present in the country.298
In 2006, Argentina launched a national program called “Patria Grande”
designed to regularize immigrant status for irregular immigrants who were
citizens of a country belonging to the Common Market of the South
(“MERCOSUR”) or associated states.299 The program allows for regularization
of all immigrants from Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay,
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela who arrived in Argentina before April 17, 2006
and relaxed the requirements and facilitated the process to achieve residency
291

Barbara Hines, The Right to Migrate as a Human Right: The Current Argentine Immigration Law, 43
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 471, 472 (2010).
292 See id.
293 Id.
294 Law No. 25.871, art. 4, Dec. 17, 2003, [30322] B.O. 2 (Arg.).
295 Hines, supra note 291, at 472; cf. Part I.A.
296 INT’L ORG. MIGRATION, supra note 16, at 62–63. The First Forum of Migrants in Paraguay in 2009
coincided with the Third Forum on Migration and American Platense Civil Rights Community. The Forum
discussed immigration, immigrant labor rights, discrimination, and xenophobia and ratified a resolution
declaring the right to migrate was a human right that must be respected by nation-states. Id.
297 Law No. 25.871, art. 7, 8, Dec. 17, 2003, [30322] B.O. 2 (Arg.).
298 Id. art. 10.
299 Argentina, INT’L ORG. MIGRATION (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/wherewe-work/americas/south-america/argentina.html.
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for persons arriving after that date.300 The program regularized almost half a
million people in its first three years, nearly 60% of which were Paraguayan.301
Though the country receives a high volume of immigrants, many of whom
are irregular, Argentina still recognizes a universal right to migrate.302 Despite
these progressive changes, there are still xenophobic and anti-immigrant
sentiments.303 The country has also had problems creating regulations to
implement the laws.304 Nevertheless, Argentina represents a unique approach
to addressing food scarcity and a positive right to migrate, that casts away
many of the restrictions in other countries and allows for migrants to enter the
country on nearly equal footing with citizens. Though broader than a positive
right to migrate due to food scarcity, the Argentine Law 25.871 and Patria
Grande program provides a model of a broad right to migrate that emphasizes
the moral imperatives underlying human rights, and migration. The Argentine
system reflects the humanitarian and economic need of migrants on a regional
scale and is an example of how shifting away from an exclusively state-centric
approach can provide remedies for individuals that fall outside of the current
legal regime.
III. ESTABLISHING A POSITIVE RIGHT TO MIGRATE AS A SOLUTION TO
FOOD SCARCITY
There is customary international law establishing the right to adequate
food. Though it is not legally binding, the UDHR has been reaffirmed
numerous times and no state has denounced the declaration.305 Additionally,
there is an affirmative practice of providing aid and food to least developed

300

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto [Ministry of Foreign Relations and Worship], Programa
Patria Grande [Great Homeland Program], GOV’T ARG., http://cpays.cancilleria.gov.ar/en/node/10066 (last
visited Feb. 12, 2014).
301 MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR [MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR], PATRIA GRANDE: PROGRAMA DE
NORMALIZACIÓN DOCUMENTARIA MIGRATORIA, INFORME ESTADISTICO [GREAT HOMELAND: PROGRAM FOR
STANDARDIZATION OF MIGRATION DOCUMENTARY, STATISTICAL REPORT], 5, 25 (Aug. 2010), available at
http://www.migraciones.gov.ar/pdf_varios/estadisticas/Patria_Grande.pdf.
302 Law No. 25.871, art. 4, Dec. 17, 2003, [30322] B.O. 2 (Arg.).
303
Eduardo E. Demenoch, La “Nueva Política Migratoria” en la Argentina: Las Paradojas del
Programa “Patria Grande” [The “New Migration Policy” in Argentina: the Paradoxes of the “Great
Homeland” Program] in MIGRACIONES INTERNACIONALES CONTEMPORÁNEAS: ESTUDIOS PARA EL DEBATE
[CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL MIGRATIONS: STUDIES FOR DEBATE] 123 (Cyntia Pizarro, Ed. 2011).
304 See Hines, supra note 291, at 472–73, 509.
305 Weber, supra note 214, at 384–85.
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countries.306 The 1996 World Food Summit declared the intention of 182 states
to reduce by half the number of chronically undernourished people by 2015.307
Reaffirmed multiple times, the most recent World Food Summit on Food
Security declared “the right of everyone to have access to safe, sufficient, and
nutritious food.”308 Finally, the second iteration of the Food Assistance
Convention (FAC) established principles of food assistance to low and middleincome countries and acknowledged the commitments of the World Food
Summit to achieve food security in all countries as part of the elimination of
poverty.309 From these conventions, universal affirmation of the UDHR, and
the actions of the international community in famine situations—such as those
taken by Kenya and the IOM to provide aid to Somali famine victims—one
may conclude that that there is customary international law for those
provisions of the UDHR that refer to economic rights and the right to food.310
This customary international law imposes an obligation on states regardless of
whether the country ratified a binding treaty such as the ICESCR.
Interestingly, all fourteen signatories to the FAC are “developed” nations and
only four—Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United States—are not
European.311 In contrast, any country listed on the OECD’s Development
Assistant Committee’s list of Official Development Assistance Recipients, a
list comprised predominantly of African, Latin American, and South Asian
countries, is eligible to receive assistance.312
Despite the clear global agreement on reducing hunger,313 the relationship
found in the FAC carries echoes of colonialism and mirrors the global division
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See e.g., Food Assistance Convention, May 8, 2012, C.N.215.2012.TREATIES-XIX.48.
Monitoring Progress Since the World Food Summit, WORLD FOOD SUMMIT, available at http://www.
fao.org/wfs/index_en.htm [hereinafter Declaration of the World Summit].
308 WORLD SUMMIT ON FOOD SECURITY, DECLARATION OF THE WORLD SUMMIT ON FOOD SECURITY, art.
16 (Nov. 16–18, 2009).
309 Food Assistance Convention, supra note 306, art. 2.
310 See Weber, supra note 214, at 387.
311 The other signatories are: Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, The European Union, Finland, France, Greece,
Luxembourg, Portugal, and Switzerland. Food Assistance Convention, supra note 306.
312 Food Assistance Convention, supra note 306, art. 4. “The DAC List of ODA Recipients shows all
countries and territories eligible to receive official development assistance (ODA). These consist of all low and
middle income countries based on gross national income (GNI) per capita as published by the World Bank,
with the exception of G8 members, EU members, and countries with a firm date for entry into the EU. The list
also includes all of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) as defined by the United Nations (UN).” DAC List
of ODA Recipients, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclistofodarecipients.htm (last visited Jan. 11,
2014).
313 See WORLD SUMMIT ON FOOD SECURITY, supra note 307.
307

STEPHENS GALLEYSPROOFS2

216

12/3/2014 8:58 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

in the human rights regime.314 The FAC states that the purchase of food locally
or regionally is an important principle in the effectiveness of food
assistance,315 which reflects the current realities of global food aid.316 The
document itself places a strong emphasis on in situ remedies, declaring in the
preamble that states have the primary responsibility for their national food
security and encouraging states to address the root causes of food insecurity.317
Regardless of the preference for in situ remedies by all parties involved—
sending states, receiving states, and food migrants themselves—local remedies
are often unavailable due to lack of state capacity or lack of will.318 In
situations where in situ options are unavailable or impractical—such as
Somalia where the governing body is simply incapable of providing adequate
protections,319 or in Paraguay where national policy has resulted in food
scarcity for marginalized populations320—what remedies are available?
It appears that there are no remedies available within the current legal
regime, which leads to two possibilities. First the international community
does nothing to help victims of food scarcity. Not only is this position morally
untenable, it contradicts the stated intent to assist victims of food scarcity that
has been affirmed by various countries such as .321 A second option is to
maintain the current system as it is and continue to recognize the moral
imperative to help famine refugees without granting them any immigration
status.322 However, the current system creates a false bright line distinction
between famines and other food scarcity situation and fails to address the legal
status of food migrants.323 If no remedies exist, but there is a strong political
will and moral impetus, the system could be modified to allow for remedies.
314

See supra Part II.C.2.
Food Assistance Convention, supra note 306, art. 2.
316 There are three significant trends in food aid: (1) Emergency relief is an increasingly large percentage
of overall aid, with a decline in food aid for development purposes; (2) There is a movement toward procuring
food aid from local and regional sources; (3) Non OECD-DAC governments are becoming increasingly
important funders but major food donors remains mostly unchanged: the US provides around half of all food
aid, followed by EU, Canada, and Japan while the top five recipients of food aid in 2008 were Ethiopia, Sudan,
Somalia, Zimbabwe, and Afghanistan. HARVEY, supra note 218, at 2.
317 Food Assistance Convention, supra note 306.
318 See generally HUNGER MAP, supra note 1.
319
See HARPER, supra note 228 at 105–06 (acknowledging that the government of Somalia cannot
perform basic security or development functions).
320 Cf. Law No. 978/1996, supra note 258, art. 20.
321 See Declaration of the World Summit, supra note 307.
322 See discussion infra Part II.A.
323 Id.
315
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Modification of the legal system to assist victims of food scarcity where in situ
remedies are unavailable could be accomplished by modifying domestic laws,
international refugee law or by adding to the body of international human
rights to establish a positive right to migrate for these vulnerable populations.
Solely relying on domestic laws is unfavorable for the same reasons that the
legal community established refugee law, namely the universality of the
problem and the unpredictability of where victims may arise in the future. Part
III.A discusses why changing refugee law would be an ineffective solution and
Part III.B examines establishing a positive right to migrate and the need of
switching to a people-centered human right approach.
A. A Positive Right to Migrate: Rejecting a Remedy Through Refugee Law
Using refugee law to establish a right to migrate due to food scarcity should
not be prohibited by the fact that many famine refugees do not seek permanent
resettlement.324 Though there is a de facto presumption of asylum and
permanent resettlement for refugees,325 refugee status is not always permanent,
and if the persecution ceases, a refugee may be returned to their home country
without violating refoulement.326 Nevertheless, food migrants fleeing food
scarcity do not qualify as refugees under the traditional definition because they
are not being persecuted based on one of the five protected categories.327
Shoehorning victims of famine or food scarcity into the definition of refugee
would require either claiming that they are being persecuted, perhaps by the
famine itself, or substantially reformulating refugee law to remove the
persecution requirement. An examination of the latter exceeds the scope of this
Comment, while the former appears to be little more than an exercise in
semantics. Though some who argue for the creation of environmental refugee
status use this semantic argument,328 it is inappropriate while other solutions to
the famine refugee are available.
At first blush, expanding refugee law to include environmental refugees
appears to be a promising strategy. It directly wrestles with a “mere victim’s”

324

Black, supra note 106, at 6.
See Martin, supra note 94, at 804–06.
326 See Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2) (2009).
327 See Refugee Convention, supra note 11, at 152–54.
328 See e.g., Cudiamat, supra note 82, at 925 (arguing that for environmental refugees, the environment is
the persecuting agent).
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right to movement and the sovereign state’s interest in territorial integrity.329
However, environmental factors are only one potential cause of food migrants.
In the case of Somalia, regional drought clearly played a role in causing the
2011 famine.330 However, parts of pastoral Kenya suffered from the same
drought but did not experience famines.331 This is a clear indication that, as
Professor Sen argues, more than simple environmental factors cause
famines.332 In the case of Paraguay, food scarcity and migration is not driven
by traditional environmental factors like drought or desertification.333 While
large mono-cropping and modern agriculture may destroy the landand aerial
spraying of agrochemicals on communities could conceivably fall within the
category of environmental conflict,334 the drivers of the food scarcity and
migration in Paraguay are substantially socio-economic.335
Augmenting the refugee law to establish a right not to be displaced also has
limited effectiveness because it assumes a local actor that can be held
accountable for failure to provide an in situ remedy. In the case of Somalia,
there is no actor to hold accountable for the displacement.336 In the case of
Paraguay, there are clearly actors responsible for the displaced communities.337
Both government actions and the actions of private entities have led to
displacement and food scarcity in Paraguay.338 However, establishing a right
not to be displaced does not protect the individuals already displaced but
focuses instead on the actors causing the displacement. While this is certainly
an important objective, it is not clear how enforcement of such a right would
differ substantially from domestic tort or criminal law. For all of these reasons,
refugee law does not present itself as a body of law that can provide security to
food migrants or in which to incorporate a positive right to migrate.

329

Martin, supra note 94, at 804–06.
IOM Appeals for US $26 Million, supra note 16.
331 Id.
332 See id.
333 PARAGUAY MIGRATION PROFILE, supra note 14, at 5–6.
334 See ANTONIOU, supra note 266; Williamson, supra note 266, at 5. However, the forced removals and
aerial spraying seem best remedied by human rights or domestic civil and criminal law.
335 PARAGUAY MIGRATION PROFILE, supra note 14, at 3.
336 See generally HARPER, supra note 228, at 105–06.
337 PARAGUAY MIGRATION PROFILE, supra note 14, at 5–6.
338 See Ley No. 978/1996 De Migraciones [Law No. 978/1996 Of Migrations], Art. 20 (Para.);
PARAGUAY MIGRATION PROFILE, supra note 14, at 5–6.
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B. Human Rights Law and the Incorporation of a Positive Right to Migrate
A positive right to migrate due to food scarcity closely aligns with the
humanitarian aims of the human rights regime.339 Viewing the right to migrate
due to food scarcity through the lens of human rights law highlights the
underlying right to adequate food. Since food scarcity has social, economic,
political, and environmental causes,340 the right to migrate due to food scarcity
is a complex amalgamation of human rights law categories. Establishing a
positive right to migrate due to food scarcity does not create a whole new
human right, rather it blends existing human rights to allow for legal status and
recognition of recurring migratory populations. In famine situations similar to
Somalia, countless lives could be saved if food migrants avoid dangerous and
furtive border crossings because they know the receiving state will accept and
help them. In a situation such as Paraguay, where there is no famine to
establish immigrants as prima facie food migrants, implementation of the right
could ease of entry for populations suffering from food scarcity, perhaps
through an expedited border crossing system. Finally, establishing a positive
right to migrate would help protect the full panoply of human rights by giving
legal status to food migrants and empowering them to challenge violations of
other rights.341 Part III.B.i discusses why a state-centric approach to human
rights is not the best forum to establish a positive right to migrate. Part III.B.I
examines the benefits of switching to a people-centric approach.
1. Deficiencies in a State-Centric Approach to Human Rights
A traditional human rights approach fails to address adequately the problem
of food scarcity because human rights law focuses only on the relationships
between States and the populous.342 Therefore, the right to adequate food is
invoked only if the state is somehow implicated in creating the food scarcity.343
If the right to life and the corresponding right to sufficient food—with all of its
economic implications—have equal status under the law, the establishment of
a right to food as a human right creates a positive obligation to act on the part
339

See REFUGEE CONSORTIUM OF KENYA, supra note 232, at 30.
See supra Part II.
341
See REFUGEE CONSORTIUM OF KENYA, supra note 232, at 23–26 (noting how Somali refugees in
Dadaab are often denied guaranteed rights including right to engage in wage-earning employment, right to own
property, right to practice a profession, right to self-employment, access to housing and right to choose place
of residence).
342 See Ahmed An-Na’im, supra note 131, at 1.
343 See id. at 1–2.
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of the State and calls for an entitlement system. This is not inherently bad, but
it does cut against the domestic norms of the U.S. and other liberal
democracies that have, wittingly or not, promulgated human rights as a means
to fight political tyranny but have not concerned themselves with economic
tyranny.344 Not only is an entitlement solution untenable to some political
actors in the West, but it presumes a state run in situ remedy, failing to address
situations in which states are powerless to meet their obligations (Somalia), or
where state complicity is only one of many intertwining political, economic
and social factors that lead to violations (Paraguay).345 The right to food
highlights the near impossibility to impose affirmative duties upon states.346
A positive right to migrate in the human rights framework raises the
additional issue of state sovereignty. The human rights regime was born into a
Westphalian world and it is ill-equipped to handle the socio-economic
interdependence that transcends national borders.347 Nowhere is this more
evident than in a positive right to migrate, which would effectively declare an
exception to territorial integrity: where an individual’s or group’s rights are
being violated due to food scarcity, and where the food scarcity cannot be
readily remedied in situ, then that individual or group has the right to migrate
internationally in order to become food secure. State sovereignty does not
come into play in this definition; in fact, the definition operates in derogation
of the exclusion principle of state sovereignty.348 Nor does the proposed right
establish an obligation from the state to the individual,349 except to oblige the
state to disregard, in particular circumstances of food scarcity, a fundamental
element of the state’s own sovereignty. While this may appear radical, it is, in
fact, what occurred for both Paraguayan and Somali migrants.350 Paraguayans
migrating to Argentina, especially those arriving after 2004, were met with an
open door policy and legal efforts to secure their rights and residency
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The Transformation of Africa, supra note 130, at 922.
See discussion infra Part II.
346 Weber, supra note 214, at 386–87 (it is much easier to persuade states to abstain from certain
activities).
347 See generally Grossman, supra note 165, at 1–2.
348 See Parrish, supra note 169, at 1100–01.
349 See Ahmed An-Na’im, supra note 131, at 1; see also Savages, Victims, and Saviors, supra note 129, at
202–03.
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regardless of their migration status.351 For Somalis, Kenya has allowed
international aid agencies to shuttle migrants from the border to refugee camps
in Kenya.352
2. Shifting to a People-Centric Approach to Human Rights
The proposal of the right to migrate due to food scarcity by a Western
academic poses a clear danger of perpetuating a Western and Eurocentric
perspective, the exact opposite of what a change to people-centric framework
hopes to achieve.353 However, the positive right to migrate due to food scarcity
finds its origin, not in political negotiations of powerful Western states, but in
the economic realities and habitual actions of vulnerable populations.354
Establishing a right from the manifest need of vulnerable populations
embodies the shift from a state-centric to people-centric approach to human
rights.355 As shown in the case of Paraguayan and Somali migrants,356 as well
as the traditional migratory patterns of Malian and other pastoralists,357
vulnerable populations facing food scarcity regularly engage in international
migrations. The legal foundations in terms of the right to life,358 the right to
adequate food,359 and the limited right to freedom of movement360 already
exist. Therefore, establishing a positive right to migrate due to food scarcity
does not create a new human right wholesale, so much as weave together
existing rights to establish legal status for certain recurring migratory
populations.
Since the right to migrate due to food scarcity represents a legal elevation
of societal behavior that runs counter to a fundamental principle of state

351

See Law No. 25.871, art. 4, Dec. 17, 2003, [30322] B.O. 2 (Arg); Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores
y Culto [Ministry of Foreign Relations and Worship], Programa Patria Grande [Great Homeland Program],
GOV’T ARG., http://cpays.cancilleria.gov.ar/en/node/10066 (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
352 100,000 Displaced Somalis, supra note 227.
353 See e.g. Baraka, supra note 4; Savages, Victims, and Saviors, supra note 129, at 204.
354 See discussion infra Part II.
355 See Baraka, supra note 4; see generally Savages, Victims, and Saviors, supra note 129.
356 See discussion infra Parts II.A, II.B.
357
CARTIER, supra note 85, at 8 (traditional circular migration patterns of pastoralist and nomadic groups
is used to gain access to better pasture, land, and water and is viewed as a positive adaptation for insecure
climates).
358 See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 3, art. 25.
359 Id.
360 See e.g., id. art. 13; Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 5, art. 8.
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sovereignty,361 a positive right to migrate will most likely not find a foothold in
a state-centric approach to human rights. Expanding to people-centric human
rights from a unilateral, state-to-citizen relationship allows economic, cultural,
and social rights to operate on multiple levels that invoke state, individual, and
community participation and responsibility.362 Such an expansion would not
only temper the individualist focus of the current human rights regime363 but
would recognize the growing and critical roles of non-state actors in the
international community364 as bound entities within the human rights
framework.365 The change would enable those entities to protect and facilitate
freedom of movement for food migrants. In the case of the Food Assistance
Convention, creating obligations for regional entities comports with the goal of
securing food aid from local sources and could remove the colonial undertones
of the current food aid system.366 Instead of Western states providing
assistance to former colonies, the paradigm could shift to local and regional
communities and organizations providing support to local and regional
communities in need.
Nevertheless, switching to a people-centric approach to human rights does
not require a complete removal of state sovereignty or negate the value of state
actors.367 In many situations the human rights community relies on strong
states to act on their behalf.368 While there are still significant questions of
what implementation of the new right might look like, Argentina’s
immigration laws provide a clear example of how a positive right to migrate
due to food scarcity could operate within the State-dominated international
system.369
361 See Parrish, supra note 169, at 1100–01 (territoriality has been the cornerstone of an international
system that, for centuries, has operated on the Westphalian principles of state sovereignty and
nonintervention).
362 See, e.g., The Transformation of Africa, supra note 130, at 899.
363 Id.
364 See e.g., infra Part II.A.ii (discussing the role of NGOs in assisting Somali refugees).
365 The belief that there is a “clear distinction between domestic and international legal issues is
fundamentally flawed” and international law needs to recognized and incorporate all international actors into
its jurisdiction. Grossman, supra note 165, at 22–23. However, the exact means of creating this new regime
should be the product of collaboration between diverse international actors that exceeds the scope of this
Comment.
366 Food Assistance Convention, supra note 306, art. 2; see infra Part I.C.
367 But cf. Parrish, supra note 169, at 1136 (recognizing and arguing against the new discourse that places
the person at the center of the international legal system and favors non-territorial models).
368 Id.
369 See infra Part II.B.ii (discussing Argentine Law No. 25.871 and Patria Grande).
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CONCLUSION
Current human rights conventions guarantee a right to adequate food. This
Comment proposes that where an individual’s or group’s right rights are being
violated due to food scarcity, and where the food scarcity cannot be readily
remedied in situ, then that individual or group has the right to migrate
internationally in order to become food secure. This positive right to migrate
due to food scarcity does not comfortably fit within the confines of refugee law
or the current human rights system. Nevertheless, the right fits closely with the
humanitarian aims of the human rights regime and may be appropriately cast in
the human rights framework if that framework is modified beyond its current
state-centric approach.
The establishment of a positive right to migrate due to food scarcity and the
shift to a people-centric human rights framework does not necessitate a
complete removal of state sovereignty or negate the importance of state actors.
In many situations the human rights community relies on strong states to act on
their behalf.370 However, the system needs to recognize the importance and
obligations of non-state actors, communal perspectives, and socio-economic
rights that can only be actualized outside the boundaries of the traditional
Westphalian system. The utility of casting a positive right to migrate in the
human rights mold depends on shifting to a people-centric as opposed to a
state-centric approach in order to accept non-state actors and regional actors as
bound entities within the human rights framework and empower those entities
to protect and facilitate freedom of movement for food migrants.
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